

Series II
Subjects Files,
1916-1973

Box 13, Folder 9

January 1958 -
July 1958

0731

749 Asbury Street
New Milford, N.J.
January 3, 1958

Rear Admiral R.W. Bates
Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Sir:

With reference to your letter of December 6, 1957 please be advised, on the night of October 24-25, 1944 I flew a search from Hinunangan Bay in Leyte Gulf, however, I do not have any factual sources to draw from, therefore the following is from memory only.

At approximately 2000 on October 24th take off was made from Hinunangan Bay and we proceeded south to the Mindanac Sea through the Surigac Strait. My order were to search the central southern part of Mindanac Sea and if no contact was made with the enemy the search was to proceed to the Sula Sea. No enemy contact was made in either sea.

We first learned of the battle for Leyte Gulf upon returning to Surigac Strait. In passing through, we received direct hits by what was believed to be friendly forces, possibly PT boats, just north east of Hibuson Island at approximately 0400 on the 25th. With radio and compass shot out we became lost until shortly after dawn. Course corrected we proceeded to Suluan Island where contact was made with Commander Sillers. Both aircrafts proceeded to Tacloban where our seaplane tender was to join the ships used for the landing in Leyte. We received fire from ships in the Tacloban area. After landing we transferred to Commander Sillers aircraft at 0830 and taxied to seaplane tender.


I am returning herewith the chart of Leyte Gulf area. The flight track is to the best of my knowledge as all records went down with the aircraft.

Very truly yours,


Maurice Moskaluk

emm/mm

0732



0733



VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

25 January 1958

Dear Rafe:

The delay in answering your letter has been caused by a variety of things. The most important one has been my desire to make sure I am informing you of an official decision made after consideration of all the factors involved.

It is increasingly difficult to justify retention of retired officers on active duty. We certainly do recognize the value of the studies which you have made highlighting lessons and analyzing important decisions of the war. We can visualize increasing interest in your works by future generations of students. We do believe, however, that your four volumes provide an adequate coverage of the most important field of command decision and have, therefore, decided that the project should be terminated. The Chief of Naval Operations is sincerely grateful to you for your magnificent contribution in adding to the store of knowledge of our great profession.

I am taking off Sunday for a short visit to the West Coast and I am looking forward with pleasure to my visit at the War College on 11 February. I shall see you then. I assure you that my admiration for you and your accomplishments is most sincere, and I hope I can continue to cherish a valuable friendship.

Sincerely yours,

Dm/

COMMO R. W. BATES, USN
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

0735



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

27 January 1958

Dear Commodore Bates:

This early summer you will have been on special assignment at the Naval War College for some nine years. You have rendered distinguished service to the Navy with your broad accomplishment in the history and tactical analysis field, and I should inform you now, well ahead of time, that it is planned to order you to inactive status on the retired list on 30 June 1958.


You have done a wonderful job and we are all grateful to you. Also, I want you to know that the move we are making is strictly in accordance with Secretarial policy and decision relative to the employment of retired officers on active duty.

I am hopeful that this five-month alert will give you sufficient time to make plans for the future.

My staff and I are at your disposal to render any assistance we can in connection with your return to inactive duty.

With kind regards, believe me, I am,

Sincerely,


J. L. HOLLOWAY, Jr.
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Commodore Richard W. Bates, USN(Ret.)
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

0736

CARD
0035

C. W. POST COLLEGE
OF
LONG ISLAND UNIVERSITY
NORTHERN BOULEVARD
BROOKVILLE, LONG ISLAND

THE PRESIDENT

February 13, 1958

Dear Arleigh,

I understand that there is under consideration the termination of the command studies which Commodore Bates has been conducting at the Naval War College. I am taking the liberty of writing to you about this because I have some special knowledge about the project that may not be known or appreciated.

This project was part of a general plan evolved by Mr. Forrestal when he was Secnav to insure that the history of the Navy's part in World War II was recorded and interpreted in order that future activities of the Navy and the Navy Department could be guided by the lessons capable of being derived from such history. Professor Morrison has of course contributed a superb narrative history that interprets the Navy's conduct of the War for the benefit of the general public and those particularly interested in the operations of our forces at sea. Professor Albion was to have written a history of the administration of the Navy Department. A critical command study of our major naval actions was started by Admiral Kalbfus, then finishing his war-time tour of active duty and about to be returned to retirement.

At the end of the War I served as a Deputy C.N.O. for a few months, and during this period Admiral Nimitz had me prepare a directive to Admiral Spruance at the Naval War College to take over the command study, place an officer with war experience in charge, and properly staff the effort. It was particularly desired that an officer be chosen who would have, not only the professional competence, the requisite educational background plus facility with writing, but who would have the persistence and drive to carry it through to completion. Bates was chosen.

2/17

0737

During the years that he has worked on this project he has accomplished an enormous amount of research into orders, despatches and reports. His work has been pronounced thorough, competent and resourceful by many and I, myself, consider it unique and invaluable. The reader is provided with the facts and the problems confronting the various naval commanders. Whether one endorses Bates' conclusions (and they are usually logical and well-conceived) or not is immaterial, because the case study is available for one's own analysis and the formulation of one's own conclusions.

I would point out that the Army has, over the years, gone into the production of historical works on a vast scale. The Marine Corps has made sure that their story has been told. While I do not think that any of these can compare to Morrison's work in interest and readability, some of them do go further into the analysis and criticisms of command decisions and the exercise of war-time command from the standpoint of the professional military man. In providing this, Bates' studies are a valuable complement to other works on naval history which are written by professional historians.

It is my opinion, from my knowledge of the initiation of this project and my close contact with it while I was President of the Naval War College, that the Navy cannot afford to let it lapse uncompleted. At the stage at which it has now arrived, where critical phases of the last and largest naval campaigns are being analyzed, I am concerned that its termination might be misunderstood. But I believe that the primary reason justifying its continuance is its merit as a history work and its value as a sound basis for the study of high command.

If consideration of Bates' status on the active list has a material influence in deciding this matter, I would like to offer an alternative. Long Island University could enter into a contract with the Navy Department to perform the necessary administrative services for continuing the studies on a research basis, the work to continue at the Naval War College, as at present. The details of such a contract and the staffing of the office could be worked out between myself and the President of the Naval War College.

0738

I offer this service not from any profit motive but in order to see to completion a project with which I had a concern in its start and an association in its development. I hope that when the decision is made the above explanation and appraisal will be considered.

Sincerely yours,
Conolly

Richard L. Conolly
Admiral, U. S. N. (Ret.)
President, Long Island University

The Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington 25, D. C.

0739

1516 34th Street, N. W.
Washington 7, D. C.
13 February 1958

Dear Rafe:

Sam Morison took me to lunch yesterday and he gave me a piece of news which distressed me. He told me that you were to be put on inactive duty at the end of this fiscal year. (His words were that you had "gotten the ax.")

I think this is not good. As you well know, I consider that the work you are doing is of prime importance. It does not lie in the field of comfortable reminiscence nor of outdated history, but rather in the very living and vital area of command decision.

It is easy--and over-facile--to say that progress in technology is so fast today as to cancel out the need for study of the record of the past. In terms of material, in terms of ship tactics, and in similar fields an approach such as the foregoing may have some merit. On the other hand, the record of the past, properly prepared and analyzed, is a record of human beings. It is a record of the very basic laws of cause and effect, particularly when translated into terms of human action and reaction. The importance of man and man's mind--particularly when under the stress of war--is, probably, one of the most important factors in our future survival.

You, of course, recognize all of this. Your work is, in fact, addressed to this very facet of national survival of the future, particularly because it deals with the mind and the reactions and decisions of men in command.

I do hope that some means will be found for you to continue your valuable analysis. I asked Sam if any thought had been given to the alternative which you had mentioned to me, the possibility of your continuing the work in a civil status. He said he had not heard of that before, but that it seemed to be one solution. I sincerely hope and trust that this solution--or any other satisfactory one--will be found.

Your Volume III has just arrived and I have been able to glance over it for a few hours. It is most impressive. It really has a swing and a refrain. It has some of the effects even of a Greek tragedy in the mounting series of events which will lead to the inevitability of the outcome. From the professional point of view, I find an enormous amount in it which is worthy of deep professional study.

0740


Congratulations again on Volume III!

Do let me hear from you. I am interested.

I am also interested in how things are doing as far as my interest in Rhode Island University is concerned. I would love to hear any comments or suggestions you have relative to that.

Barbara was equally distressed at hearing Sam Morison's news, and she asked me to send you her love.

Ever your friend, +

the best always - 

THOMAS H. ROBBINS, JR.
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy

Rear Admiral R. W. Bates, USN (Ret.)
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

0741



VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

21 February 1958

Dear Rafe:

I have given a great deal of thought to our conversation in Newport and to your 11 February memorandum. Your project has been discussed again with naval authorities here in Washington. It is necessary to confirm the decision about which you were notified in my 25 January letter. Among other things, this means that you have a little over four months to complete your volume on the Battle of Surigao Strait. I am reasonably sure that Slim Ingersoll will provide additional technical assistance which you may need to accelerate the project. Perhaps it will be necessary for you to leave your complete draft in the hands of the War College Staff for them to make the final review and see to having it printed. I think you must have misunderstood what Slim meant when you talked to him after my departure from Newport. He probably meant that your work must be finished by 30 June if the volume is to be printed at all.

Please understand that what I have said above is not intended to be harsh. On the contrary, I am giving you a frank and honest answer to questions which you have posed. It is not possible to extend your active duty beyond 30 June 1958, and it is necessary to re-allocate the personnel who are connected with your project.

As stated in my 25 January letter, the Chief of Naval Operations has the highest regard for your professional contribution to the store of naval knowledge made during the past ten years.

Sincerely yours,

Don Felt

COMMO R. W. BATES, USN
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

0742



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

7 MAR 1958

Dear Admiral Conolly:

This is in answer to your letter of 13 February concerning the continuation of World War II Battle Evaluation work being done by Commodore R. W. Bates, USN(Ret.).

The value of the studies is certainly recognized, and the highlighted lessons and analysis of important command decisions will be studied by students for many years. However, I feel that the basic purpose of the work has already been accomplished, and further studies will tend to embellish cardinal lessons previously covered. After a thorough review of the entire project, it appears that continuation of this work beyond 30 June 1958 cannot be justified in the light of the current budget and personnel situation.

Your generous offer to assist in the furtherance of these studies and Commodore Bates' fine work is appreciated. Again, I feel that we could not justify the expenditures involved, in view of the budgetary restrictions which are forcing us to cancel items of much greater urgency. It is regretted that a more favorable reply is not possible.

Sincerely yours,

ARLEIGH BURKE

Admiral Richard L. Conolly, USN(Ret.)
President
Long Island University
P. O. Box 247
Greenvale, Long Island, N. Y.

0743

ROBT. B. CARNEY
ADMIRAL, UNITED STATES NAVY, (RET.)
SUITE 207, COMMONWEALTH BUILDING
1625 K STREET, N. W.
TELEPHONE NATIONAL 8-8843

10 March 1958

My dear Rafe:


I am not in the habit of sending people's letters to others, but in the case of your letter of the 6th of March I felt that time might very well be of importance, so I sent it on to Arleigh, copy of my note to Arleigh attached.

I could not very well write at greater length, or more strongly, because I do not have first-hand factual knowledge of the sort required to put up an argument. Furthermore, I have tried to keep my nose out of the Navy's business except when called upon - I did not like retired officers trying to tell me how to run the Navy when I was holding the bag.

However, I earnestly hope that you will be permitted to continue your fine work and, as I told Arleigh, I doubt if it will ever be finished properly if you are taken off it now.

Gracie and I missed the lousy Winter weather by sneaking off to the Caribbean for a very wonderful sailing cruise up the Antilles. It was a wonderful holiday but we are just as glad to be home again. She joins me in all the best.

As ever,


ROBT. B. CARNEY
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Encl:
Copy of ltr to ADM A.A. Burke, USN
dtd 10 Mar 1958

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN (Ret.)
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

RBC:si

0744

10 March 1958

My dear Arleigh:

I refer the enclosure to you, for your own personal information, because it seems to me that the issue is one of ultimate importance to the Navy.

Rafe is doing a thorough and unique job which will probably never be completed if he is pulled off it.

I ain't stickin' my nose in your business, but I am hoping.

As ever,

ROBT. B. CARNEY
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Encl:

Copy of ltr from R.W. Bates of 6 Mar 1958

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN
Chief of Naval Operations
Room 4E628 - The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

RBC:si

Copy to:

→ CDR R. W. Bates

0745



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Op-29/gmj

Ser: 01012P29

24 April 1958

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Rear Admiral R. W. Bates, USN (Ret.)
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

Dear Rafe:

Herewith come the Advatis Bulletins. I think this is exactly what you want and hope it is useful. If you need anything else, let me know.

All the best in the big project and I hope it continues despite the omens.

This letter may be downgraded to Unclassified when Enclosure is removed!!

All good luck to you.

E. M. Eller

E. M. ELLER
Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Director of Naval History

Enclosure (1)
Advatis Bulletins

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0746

copy

26 May 1958

I am in complete sympathy with your thoughts on the necessity for some deep thinking on the background for the formulation of basic theory of modern war. I have not done much myself of late years and would have my doubts at having any of my thinking being either accepted or even acceptable. I do not see much opportunity for time to devote to such pursuits until I retire again.

As you know I had my say about the project upon which Rafe was engaged. I would not attach any sinister motives to the termination of his work, merely lack of real appreciation of its importance and its value.

What really shocked me in your correspondence was the lack of participation by naval officers in the Ohio State University National Security Policy Seminar "Schedule of Topics and Speakers". Allocation of subjects seems to have ignored participation by the Navy in modern warfare. Designation of speakers would seem to indicate a paucity of speakers with naval background who are recognized (at least by Ohio State) as being qualified and proficient in the various fields which are considered to be significant to a study of national security. Our actual representation was purely pro-forma. If this even approximates a measure of our production senior officers who are recognized authorities in modern warfare we had better take stock and see if we cannot improve our naval educational effort particularly with regard to the assignment of more of our best minds to higher educational pursuits. We are being master-minded off the boards by a group of well-educated, articulate and highly intelligent elite from the other services. If we don't come to we will be operating a ferry service in the back areas. I have heard murmurings that this instance is far from unique. If so, it should be a matter of great concern to the Naval Service that we have descended to such a position.

copy

0747

copy

Helen joins me in best regards to you and Isabel.

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
Admiral, U. S. N. (ret.)
President, Long Island University

Rear Admiral H. E. Eccles, USN, (ret.)
101 Washington Street
New port, Rhode Island

copy

0748

5 June 1958

Dear Captain Renard:

I don't like to bother you but I have a problem to solve and since you were CTG 73.7 at the Battle for Leyte Gulf perhaps you can solve it.

The problem is somewhat complex and consists of several parts. You may recall that three PBY's were sent out on the night of 24-25 October, 1944 from Leyte Gulf. Two planes, departing after sunset, were to search Surigao Strait, Mindanao Sea and Sulu Sea. One of the pilots, Commander James F. Merritt, Jr., states in a letter to me, that at 2130 off Bohol Island he had sighted a Japanese heavy cruiser in the Mindanao Sea but had not reported it because he had been briefed to make no reports unless the Japanese fleet was sighted.

Since this seems to have been a most extraordinary briefing it would be of interest to me to learn whether or not you remember such an order. Can you verify the pilot's statement? Could he have misunderstood his briefing? Actually the pilot was an experienced pilot who should not have misunderstood his orders.

The Japanese THIRD Section (Southern Force) was divided into two parts at this time. One, the northern part consisting of the FUSO and YAMASHIRO and one destroyer was moving along the south coast of Bohol; the other part consisting of the MOGAMI and DESDIV FOUR was passing up through the center of the Mindanao Sea. These units were steering about 060°(T).

Since these Japanese groups were traveling at eighteen knots and there was moonlight it is not clear why they were not discovered. Have you any thoughts on this matter? Commander Merritt states that his radar was inoperative from the time he passed Oldendorf's units moving to take station at the northern end of Surigao Strait until he reached Negros Island when it became operative again. But what about the other plane?

0749

This latter plane was flown by a Lieutenant Moskaluk who, in writing to me, indicates that he also flew over or in the vicinity of the same forces (Japanese THIRD Section and the SECOND Striking Force) in the Mindanao Sea without sighting either. It would appear that Moskaluk's radar was also inoperative or incapable of detecting large Japanese surface formations at relatively short range. Why this might be so is not clear for the radars should have been good enough for limited results, (i.e., thirty miles) and the Mindanao Sea is but sixty miles wide.

Similarly, in studying Lieutenant Siller's account of his flight (in a letter to me) which covered the Samar littoral, it appears that he flew through San Bernardino Strait shortly before the Main Body of the Japanese FIRST Striking Force reached there and later retracing his track flew perhaps within twenty miles of the same force-- again without gaining contact. Was Siller's radar also ineffective?

Finally I should like to know why having ordered five planes to make these searches but three took off.

Your opinions regarding these questions that have been raised would be of considerable value in helping me to correctly understand and properly evaluate the actions of these planes on this night during which the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force (Center Force), the THIRD Section, and the SECOND Striking Force were able to approach Leyte Gulf during the night without being contacted let alone shadowed by the Leyte-based PBX's, although their presence and location was precisely known during the afternoon.

With best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES
Rear Admiral, USN (Ret)

Captain Jack C. Renard, USN
Staff, Commander Fleet Air Jacksonville
U.S. Naval Air Station
Jacksonville, Florida

0750

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

July 7, 1958

Dear Captain Renard:

On 5 June we sent you a letter, copy herewith enclosed, relative to the operations of CTG 73.7 in the Leyte Operation. We are awaiting anxiously to hear from you as you are the final link in our source material.

We have had some of the pilots concerned in this office and we have discussed matters with them. The principle one, Commander Sillers, is at Quonset Point. Also, your former Chief of Staff, Captain Eisenbach, is here at the Naval War College. Captain Eisenbach has very little to offer, spent some days here with us, and is highly interested, but doesn't seem to have the facts. Commander Sillers has given us some information which checks with that from the Japanese side.

One point of enormous concern is the fact that ten planes arrived Leyte Gulf on the afternoon of October 23rd, which planes were sent down to Hinunangan Bay (an anchorage adjacent to Surigao Strait) where there were two tenders, the HALF MOON and SAN CARLOS. Your flag was in the SAN CARLOS. From the dispatches it appears as if the HALF MOON tended all ten planes. Do you happen to know whether this is really true? This is a particularly important point, as pointed out in the basic letter. You were ordered to send out five planes and only three went. Could it have been that only three out of the ten planes were ready for action, and, if so, what was the cause? Actually your final orders called for five planes to be sent out at night and two in the morning, making a total of seven.

It was suggested by Commander Sillers that perhaps the squadrons that flew into Leyte Gulf on the 23rd (VPB's 33 and 34) were supposed to be tended by both AVP's, but in the press of the developing situation only one squadron was able to be utilized for the night search since the SAN CARLOS had departed Hinunangan Bay early in the morning (0821) for San Pedro Bay about forty miles to the north. He admits that the idea is largely conjecture and it seems highly unlikely to us. However, another point is the fact that no planes of VPB-34 were flown on that evening. Could this also have been due to maintenance requirements?

I am sending you herewith my first draft of the operations of your command for this day for my volume V.

0751

Since the time remaining to complete this analysis is limited, it is requested that you reply as soon as practicable.

With best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,



R. W. BATES
Rear Admiral, USN (Ret)

Captain Jack C. Renard, USN
Staff, Commander Fleet Air, JACKSONVILLE
U. S. Naval Air Station
Jacksonville, Fla.

0752

July 15, 1958

Dear Adm. Bates:

I must apologize for the delay in answering your request for information, such as I can recall, relative to the Leyte operation - However I have been on the move since early June and your letter just caught up with me here at Gates Mills Ohio where I arrived last weekend.

To the best of my knowledge and relying on my memory after fourteen years - The following sequence of events are as I recall them:

0753

On the morning of 23 Oct the San Carlos and Half Moon Bay were anchored in Humnangan Bay preparing moorings for the advance elements of UBB 33 + 34 consisting of ten planes.

As I recall we had considerable difficulty getting the planes in Peete Gulf and to the anchorage, in as much as they were repeatedly fired upon by our own forces and at least two planes were damaged by AA fire - By the time all planes had made their moorings and secured it was night and such maintenance as was possible was carried out under most trying conditions

0754

As we were in condition One -

I believe that out of the ten planes that arrived only eight or nine were available for operations as the others had sustained damage not readily repairable from Gun fire (our own)!

Both Tenders were tending the planes on the afternoon and evening (The 23rd) of their arrival and on through the night and early morning of the next day - the 24th -

About 0700 orders were received from CTF 77 for San Carlos to shift anchorage to San Pedro Bay leaving only The Half Moon to tend and service the Aircraft. CTG 73.7 was directed to report to CTF 77 via crash

0755

boat to the Wasatch.

CTG 73.7 reported to CTF 77 about 0900 (24th) and was given orders to fly the sectors as described in your resume - CTG 73.7 was directed to return to San Carlos and set up the searches as ordered. Orders were sent by CTG 73.7 to the Half Moon in compliance with these orders, and establishing the sectors to be searched that night. The same afternoon CTF 77 directed that in addition to the three sectors previously designated to be searched, that two additional planes were to search the Jungas Strait - Mudanca Sea and Sulu Sea Areas. This would
4.

0756

now require five planes for night searches - These orders were transmitted to the Half Moon Bay with the additional directives for the two following daylight searches -

I must be understood that this was a monumental task for one tender to undertake, in view of the number of planes involved and the number of planes available for the task - This combined with the limited services available - The fact these planes were all water borne - that there were repeated red alerts and air attacks going on constantly - the refueling, servicing and maintenance operations were repeatedly interrupted.

0757

However the seriousness of the situation was well understood and it was known that the Half Moon Bay would do everything possible to meet the requirements of the searches.

I cannot recall exactly how many planes made the night searches, and accept your more factual information without question, but I believe that more than three planes actually left the Half Moon to start the searches, but for some reason or reason, which I cannot recall, failed to conduct their search -

Radar maintenance was a major problem in operating from small fields and this may be a contributing factor why some of the planes failed to

0758

Continue on the search —

To the best of my recollection, orders were sent to the Half Moon to expedite getting the searches off as soon as possible, in order that the Half Moon could move out from Hinnangan Bay prior to sunset so that there would be no friendly vessels between our approaching Battle Force and the enemy — However the Half Moon was unable to clear all planes — either on search or to the San Carlos until well after sunset and was therefore forced to remain at her anchorage.

I cannot recall our exact orders for the night searches, but I have

the impression that when I called on CTF 77 on the morning of the 24th I was directed to brief my pilots to the effect that they were to maintain radio silence unless the "Main Body" of the enemy was sighted -

As to the failure of the pilot who sighted the Mogami to make a thorough search of the Area, that is a matter decision on the pilots part - and it is believed quite possible and understandable that he may have considered the Mogami an extreme advance unit and his best decision was therefore to continue along his predetermined search line.

0760

It must be kept in mind that these searches were flown at night - and that even under the most ideal conditions it is most difficult to locate even large objects at sea.

As to the plane which failed to contact the main body of the First Striking Force in the San Bernardino Strait - Samar Area, the same possibilities exist. It is extremely possible that contact would not be made unless the plane passed within a mile or two of the ships, without the aid of radar -

Please understand Admiral I am not trying to make excuses for

the failure of the search planes to locate the Enemy Force - but am simply pointing out the conditions that did exist in order that you may be able to make your analysis with the best possible understanding.

I hope that the above resume, although admittedly sketchy, will assist you, in some small way. If I can be of further assistance please do not hesitate to call on me -

Respectfully
J. C. Runcel -
Deer Admiral USA, (Ret)

0762